State of Utah v. Dawn Marie Downs : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
State of Utah v. Dawn Marie Downs : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joanne C. Slotnik; Assiatant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Roger S.
Blaylock; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Linda M. Jones; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Downs, No. 20070526 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/353
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAWN MARIE DOWNS, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20070526-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION ON ONE COUNT OF 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
IN A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-
37-8(2) (e) (SUPP. 2005), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN, PRESIDING 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
ROGER S. BLAYLOCK 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
LINDA M. JONES 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE rn i »R . 
FEB t 5 ?W 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAWN MARIE DOWNS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070526-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION ON ONE COUNT OF 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
IN A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-
37-8(2) (e) (SUPP. 2005), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN, PRESIDING 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
ROGER S. BLAYLOCK 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
LINDA M. JONES 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 
IN THIS PROSECUTION FOR DRUG POSSESSION IN A CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITY, THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY ADMITTED, OVER RULE 
401 AND 403 OBJECTIONS, EVIDENCE OF HOW POLICE CAME TO 
FIND DRUGS IN DEFENDANT'S PANTS POCKET BECAUSE THAT 
EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE 
THAT SHE POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE AND WAS UNLIKELY TO 
HAVE CAUSED THE JURY TO CONVICT HER ON AN IMPROPER BASIS . 8 
A. Rules 401 and 403 govern this case 10 
B. Rule 404(b) 15 
CONCLUSION 19 
ADDENDUM A - Argument and Ruling on Rule 403 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
U.S. v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1980) 17 
United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269 (10th Cir. 1995) . . . 17 
STATE CASES 
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 
797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990) 16 
State v. Bovd, 2001 UT 30, 25 P.3d 985 11, 14, 17 
State v. Castillo, 2007 UT App 324, 
170 P.3d 1147 1, 2, 7,15, 16 
State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978) 15 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992) 2, 4, 6, 15 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 16, 973 P.2d 404 10 
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) 16 
State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34 P.3d 805 10 
State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989) 12, 16 
State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207 (Utah App. 1991) 18 
State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986) 15, 17 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995) 16 
State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1996) 11 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) 15 
Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84 158 P.3d 552 12, 16 
ii 
STATE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (SUPP. 2005) 1 
STATE RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 401 10 
Utah R. Evid. 403 11 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAWN MARIE DOWNS, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20070526-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility, 
a second degree felony (R. 170-72). This Court has jurisdiction 
over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 
2004) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In this prosecution for drug possession, did the trial court 
reasonably admit, over defendant's rule 401 and 403 objections, 
evidence of how police came to find drugs in her pants pocket? 
An appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court "to 
admit or exclude evidence under [r]ule 403 [using] an abuse of 
discretion standard." State v. Castillo, 2007 UT App 324, SI 6, 
170 P.3d 1147 (citation omitted). A lower court's decision to 
admit evidence will not be reversed "unless it is ^beyond the 
limits of reasonability.'" Id. (quoting State v. Hamilton,, 827 
P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, defines "relevant 
evidence:" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, governs the exclusion of 
relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony (R. 
2-3). The information was subsequently amended to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility, 
a second degree felony (R. 103-04). A jury convicted defendant 
of the amended charge (R. 156). The court sentenced her to a 
suspended term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, 
180 days in the county jail, 36 months of supervised probation, a 
2 
fine, and conditions of probation (R. 170-72). Defendant filed a 
timely notice of appeal (R. 173). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Around 11 o'clock on a November night in 2005, police 
officers executed a search warrant targeting a drug distribution 
operation at 2965 South 700 East in Salt Lake City (R. 184: 115-
16). The warrant specifically named Brian Stevens, who had twice 
sold drugs to a confidential informant and who had been under 
police surveillance for several weeks, and also generally 
referenced "all persons present at the home" (Id. at 141, 148). 
Stevens' girlfriend, the defendant in this case, had been living 
with Stevens for two to three years and was at home when the 
police arrived with the warrant (Id. at 121, 130, 145, 207, 223; 
R. 185: 256). In searching the home, officers found 
methamphetamine, packaging materials commonly used in drug 
distribution, other materials used to store and secret drugs, and 
more than $4000 in cash in a safe in the closet of the couple's 
bedroom (R. 184: 121-28). Defendant told the officer in charge 
that "she didn't know anything that was going on in the home and 
didn't want to talk to [him]." Id. at 132; accord R. 185: 303. 
In executing the warrant, officers utilized standard police 
procedure, including identifying and running warrants checks on 
all persons present (R. 184: 129-30). When the officers ran a 
warrants check on defendant, they discovered two outstanding 
misdemeanor justice court warrants, wholly unrelated to the 
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search warrant they were executing (Id. at 131, 167, 175) . 
Defendant was transported to jail on the outstanding warrants 
(Id. at 167). 
Prior to turning defendant over to jail personnel for 
admittance, the transportation officer asked her if she had 
"[a]ny kind of weapons or contraband, [or] controlled substances'''' 
with her "because if they take anything into the jail[,] it's an 
additional charge" (Id. at 168-69). A jail worker later asked 
defendant the same question (Id. at 156, 160). She maintained 
that she did not (Id. at 157, 169). When the jail worker 
subsequently searched defendant, however, the worker found a 
small plastic baggie of methamphetamine in the right front coin 
pocket of her pants (Id. at 157-58, 171-72). A Utah Crime 
Laboratory technician testified that both the unusual pink color 
of the plastic baggie found in the pants and the appearance of 
the methamphetamine itself was consistent with the baggies and 
drugs found in the home (Id. at 193, 197, 198). Nonetheless, 
defendant told the worker "that she didn't know where that 
[baggie of methamphetamine] came from and that it was not hers" 
(Id. at 162). 
Defendant did not contest that she physically possessed the 
methamphetamine. Instead, she maintained that her possession was 
not intentional or knowing (R. 185: 319-23). Her defense rested 
on activities that occurred earlier on November 30, just a few 
hours before police executed the warrant (Id. at 329-30). 
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Defendant's girlfriends, Karen and Misty, testified that 
they, along with one additional friend, had planned a joint 
birthday lunch at Chuck-A-Rama on November 30 (R. 184: 204, 213). 
When Karen arrived at defendant's home to pick her up, defendant 
was not ready to go, so the women decided to drive to Thrift 
Town, a nearby used clothing store, to find some "good deals'' 
while waiting for defendant (Id. at 205, 208-09). 
Karen, who had worked at Thrift Town, testified that much of 
the clothing sold at Thrift Town was not washed before being 
sold, and that employees did not routinely check the pockets of 
the clothing (Id. at 218, 230). Consequently, she occasionally 
found things—such as Kleenex, a rubber, and a $10 bill—in pockets 
of Thrift Town clothing (IdL. at 219, 231). 
Karen testified that she bought two shirts and two or three 
pairs of pants that afternoon. She put them in her car, along 
with several other pairs of pants she had previously purchased 
for her grown daughter (Id. at 210-11, 226-27). The women then 
returned to defendant's home to pick her up, and they all drove 
to the restaurant together (Id. at 212-13, R. 185: 252, 267). 
Karen and Misty testified that, as they reached the 
restaurant parking lot, defendant had a "cough attack" that 
resulted in her urinating in her pants (R. 184: 215, R. 185: 252, 
2 68). Karen remembered the pants she had purchased for her 
daughter and pressed defendant to try on one of those pairs 
instead of taking the time to return home to change (R. 184: 
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215, 229; R. 185: 252-53, 269-70). Defendant found a pair of 
pants that fit, wore them for lunch, and eventually returned home 
(R. 184: 217, 220; R. 185: 253, 273). Later that night, when the 
police officers found the methamphetamine in her pocket, 
defendant was still wearing the Thrift Town pants. Defendant 
thus argued that the pants in which the methamphetamine was found 
were not hers and that she did not knowingly or intentionally 
possess the drug. 
After considering the evidence, the jury convicted defendant 
of possession of a controlled substance in a correctional 
facility, a second degree felony (R. 156). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant sought exclusion of all evidence relating to the 
execution of the search warrant for drug distribution that 
targeted the man with whom she lived. She argued that the 
evidence was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, and thus 
violated rules 401 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
trial court admitted the evidence. 
The trial court's ruling was not "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 
1992). Pursuant to rule 401, the evidence was plainly relevant. 
First, evidence that defendant had outstanding justice court 
warrants was relevant to explain why she was at the jail and 
subject to the search that revealed the drugs. It provided the 
necessary factual predicate for the jury to understand how and 
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why the methamphetamine was found. Second, evidence that 
methamphetamine and unusual, small pink baggies were found in 
defendant's home makes defendant's knowledge and intent to 
possess the same drug packagec. In the same colored baggie more 
probable than if the jury did not have the evidence about the 
drug: ie home. 
Pursuant to rule 403, the probative value of this relevant 
evidence was not substantia] ] y outweii:1' --• ? • ^ the danger :>f i 11 if ad r 
prejudice or confusion of the issues. The evidence was highly 
probative, both of her knowledge and intent and of the 
circumstances leading up to the discovery of methamphetamine on 
her person. And as the trial court determined, any prejudice was 
"minimal," well below "undu[] > ] prejudd c[d a 3 ] .' ' Defendant has 
wholly failed to articulate how mere knowledge of two misdemeanor 
warrants could have s :> inflamed the jury a s to convict 1 Ier c i I 1:1 ie 
basis of those warrants rather than on the basis of the 
methamphetamine found in her pocket. Similarly, she offers no 
cogent explanation of how the items found in the house likely so 
confused the jury as to cause the jury to convict her improperly. 
Because the trial court's decision was not "beyond the limits of 
reasonability," this Court should affirm it. Castillo, 2007 UT 
App 32 ^  
Defendant also argues that the evidence should have been 
excluded pursuant to rule 404(b). This argument fai"1 - n 
multiple grounds. First, defendant failed to preserve it below. 
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Second, even if the Court considers the argument, it should be 
rejected because the evidence does not fall within the ambit of 
rule 404(b). Finally, even if this Court were to reach the issue 
and determine that rule 404(b) applies, the evidence was 
introduced for clear, non-character purposes. For these reasons, 
defendant's rule 404(b) claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
IN THIS PROSECUTION FOR DRUG 
POSSESSION IN A CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITY, THE TRIAL COURT 
REASONABLY ADMITTED, OVER RULE 401 
AND 403 OBJECTIONS, EVIDENCE OF HOW 
POLICE CAME TO FIND DRUGS IN 
DEFENDANT'S PANTS POCKET BECAUSE 
THAT EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT TO 
DEFENDANT'S INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE 
THAT SHE POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE 
AND WAS UNLIKELY TO HAVE CAUSED THE 
JURY TO CONVICT HER ON AN IMPROPER 
BASIS 
Prior to trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of 
evidence detailing the execution of the search warrant at the 
home defendant shared with Brian Stevens, the named target of a 
drug distribution investigation. Counsel argued that this 
evidence was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial and thus 
violated rules 401 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See 
Br. of Aplt. at 14. Specifically, counsel asserted that because 
defendant was not charged with anything found in her home, 
evidence about what was found there would be irrelevant and 
confusing and would prejudice the jury against her. Id. at 15-
17. 
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Ii I rejecting defendant's argument, the trial court first 
determined that the evidence was relevant. The court reasoned: 
"[T]he burden on the State is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
[defendan | knowledge and intent into [sic] possessing the 
methamphetamine. [T]his evidence goes directly to 
[defendanl knowledge an• i i nten 1:; therefore, i t :i s a 1: • s c «.1 I 1 1 = 1 y 
relevant" -. _ 18 or addendum A ) . Thus, because the evidence 
directly addressed the mens rea of t: 1 Ie charge• i crime t :i t v, as 
clearly relevant. Second, the court weighed whether or not the 
evidence was prejudicial or confusing. Determining that it was 
not, the count stated: 
It is not confusing to [the jury], . . . 1L 
actually gives them context. . . [I]n order 
to prove . . . possession of a controlled 
substance the State has got to prove that 
[defendant] possessed the methamphetamine. 
Whether or not that is shown at the jail or 
at another place is not more prejudicial to 
[defendant]. . . [T]he fact that it comes in 
in the context that it was at a search 
warrant at a residence where she was . . . 
goes directly to her knowledge and lack of 
mistake. So that goes specifically to . , , 
the State's ability to enter this in its case 
in chief. 
[A]nything that makes the possession more 
knowing, more intentional, more likely than 
not is by definition relevant, and the 
prejudice is simply not extensive at all. 
The only prejudice that goes to [defendant] 
is that she possessed an . . . unlawful 
controlled substance. 
Id. at 18-19 or addendum A. The court thus determined that 11:le 
evidence was not confusing and that any minimal prejudice was not 
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unfair. Because the court concluded that the evidence presented 
no danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues, that 
evidence could not substantially outweigh its highly probative 
value. The court, therefore, admitted the evidence. Id. at 18. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. 
A. Rules 401 and 403 govern this case. 
Evidence is relevant if it possesses "any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. This 
means that "even evidence that is only slightly probative in 
value is relevant." State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, 1 31, 44 P.3d 
805 (citing State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 27, 994 P.2d 177). 
Because even evidence with minimal probative value is relevant, 
the standard for determining the relevancy of evidence is "very 
low." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, M 12, 16, 973 P.2d 404 
(quoting Edward L* Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 
4-2 (1996)). 
Applying this low threshold, the evidence in this case is 
relevant.1 Evidence that defendant had outstanding justice court 
warrants was relevant to explain why she was admitted to jail and 
thus subject to the search that revealed the drugs. It provided 
1
 Defendant on appeal objects generally to all "evidence at 
trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the 
house" (Br. of Aplt. at 18). For analytical purposes, the State 
draws a distinction between the evidence of the outstanding 
warrants and the physical evidence found in the home. 
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the necessary factual predicate for the jury to understand how 
and why the methamphetamine was found. Evidence that particular 
drugs and distinctive pink baggies were found in defendant's home 
was relevant because '• made defendant' s 1 knowledge ai id intent to 
possess the same drugs packaged in the same way more probable 
than :i f 1:1: 1 e j ury did not have the evidence about the di ags :i i i the 
home. That is, the methamphetamine and packaging found in 
defendant's home was consistent with the methamphetamine and 
packaging found in her pocket, and so undermines the credibility 
of her claims that she knew nothing about what was going on in 
the home and had no knowledge of, nor any intent to, possess the 
methamphetamine found in her pocket. 
Once a determines that evidence :is relevant, 
then decide whether the "probative value (of the evidence) i.-
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejud'" r ^ 
confusion of the issues." Utah R. Evid. 403. Rule 403 is an 
"inclusionary rule," and "presumes the admission of all relevant 
evidence except where the evidence has xan unusual propensity to 
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead' the jury." State v. 
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
On appeal, review of a 403 ruling, as with rule 401, ' ,-
"limited," with the tria1 court accorded "wide lat * :•- " State 
v. Bovd, 2001 UT 30, 1 23, 25 P.3d 985 (citation omitted). 
The 403 inquiry involves balancing the probative value of 
the evidence against its unfairly prejudicial or confusing effect 
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to determine whether the unfairly prejudicial or confusing effect 
"substantially outweighs" the probative value. The Utah Supreme 
Court has elaborated upon what constitutes "unfair prejudice": 
Since all effective evidence is prejudicial 
in the sense of being damaging to the party 
against whom it is offered, prejudice which 
calls for exclusion is given a more 
specialized meaning: an undue tendency to 
suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly but not necessarily an emotional 
one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, 
contempt, retribution or horror. 
State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989). The fact that 
evidence is prejudicial does not alone render it incompetent. 
Indeed, XN>[t]he exclusion of relevant evidence under rule 403 is 
an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly.'" Woods v. Zeluff, 
2007 UT App 84, 58, 158 P.3d 552 (citing K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss 
Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1155 (10th Cir. 1985)). 
Here, the evidence detailing the execution of the warrant 
at defendant's home, including the drugs, money, and 
paraphernalia found there, and the two unrelated outstanding 
misdemeanor warrants against her were highly probative of her 
knowledge and intent and of the circumstances leading up to the 
discovery of the methamphetamine on her person. And, as the 
trial court determined, that evidence was not "unduly" 
prejudicial within the meaning of rule 403 because it did not 
have "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper 
basis." Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984. 
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Evidence about defendant's outstanding misdemeanor warrants 
had no tendency to inflame the jury or motivate them to convict 
her on any improper basis. Two police officers testified about 
the standard procedures used d/urii i 1 g search warrant execution, 
including running warrants checks on all persons present in the 
home (R 1 8 4 i ] 3 0 3 3 , 1 6 6 - 6 7 ) . The f act tha 1: office r s :ii s cov ered 
that defendant had two outstanding misdemeanor warrants explained 
only why she was transported to jail. It explained the 
circumstances and set the scene for the subsequent search of her 
person and discovery of methamphetamine. It did not, however, 
suggest that the jury should convict her on the basis of the 
misdemeanor warrants. Indeed, it is difficult to surmise how the 
jury could have been improperly influenced by the unspecified 
misdemeanor warrants in light of the evidence that she had 
committed a far more serious second degree felony. Where 
defendant has wholly failed to explain how mere knowledge of 
these outstanding misdemeanor warrants could have so inflamed the 
jury as to convict her of a second degree felony on the basis of 
those warrants rather than the evidence presented at trial, her 
claim fails. 
Similarly, evidence about what was found in the home did not 
have an undue tendency to suggest that the jury si101 lid convict 
defendant on an improper basis. Renewing her trial court 
argument, defendant contends that the drugs, paraphernalia, and 
cash found in the home created the potential for so much 
13 
confusion that the evidence should be excluded (Br. of Aplt. at 
17-18). Had defendant been charged only with possession of a 
controlled substance, the jury might well have been confused 
about whether that charge was directed at the drugs found in her 
home or on her person. The state, however, amended the original 
information to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance in a correctional facility. Compare R. 2-3 with R. 
103-04. In addition, the jury was specifically instructed that, 
to convict defendant, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant "was within a correctional facility" when she possessed 
the drugs (R. 136). Thus, the trial court ensured that evidence 
related to the search warrant would not cause confusion for the 
jury. 
Moreover, evidence about defendant's living environment was 
no more prejudicial that it was probative. That is, while the 
drugs in the home damaged her credibility, they did not do so 
unfairly. The evidence in her home simply undermined her 
credibility when she maintained she knew nothing about the drugs 
in her pocket. Defendant has wholly failed to articulate why she 
thinks this evidence would cause the jury to convict her on an 
improper basis. 
The ruling in this case to admit the evidence pursuant to 
rule 403 thus falls well within the ambit of evidence that tells 
the story of the charged crime or explains the circumstances 
surrounding the crime. See, e.g. , Boyd, 2001 UT 30 at SI 24 
14 
(admitting evidence of "nicknames, chants, and dances'7 because it 
provided background for the rape that followed); State v. 
Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978)(allowing evidence that 
defendant hdd siphoned gas to fuel a stolen car because it 
"explain[ed] the circumstances surrounding the . crime [of 
car theft] ), • State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d ' • .i 
1986)(admitting evidence that defendant paid for stolen property 
with marijuana because it was relevant 1 :« : > she w ""general 
circumstances surrounding defendant's purchase, receipt, and 
retention of the stolen property"). 
The trial court admitted the evidence in this case because 
it was "absolutely relevant" and, therefore, highly probative and 
because the prejudice was "not extensive at all" (R, 184: 19) . • 
In the court's judgment, the balancing required by rule 403 
tipped heavily for admissioi I. This decision was not "^beyond the 
limits of reasonability'" and should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Castillo, 2007 UT App 324, 1 6 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). 
B. Rule 404(b) 
On appeal, counsel also argues that the trial court's 
decision to admit the evidence violated rule 404(b).2 
2
 To demonstrate the court's abuse of discretion, counsel 
engages in a lengthy rule 404(b) argument, applying the analysis 
articulated in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), See. 
Br. of Aplt. at 10-11, 14-18. Rule 404(b) provides for the 
admissibility of prior bad acts evidence if that evidence has a 
non-character purpose, is relevant, and possesses probative value 
that is not substantially outweighed by a non-character purpose. 
15 
Defendant's claim based on rule 404(b) is not properly before 
this Court. At trial, counsel did not assert a rule 404(b) 
argument. See R. 184: 13-17. Because she did not, her rule 
404(b) argument is not preserved and should not be considered on 
appeal. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 
(Utah 1993) (xx[t]rial counsel must state clearly and specifically 
all grounds for objection" in order to preserve issue for 
appeal). Neither has defendant asserted plain error or 
exceptional circumstances, the two main exceptions to the 
preservation rule. The law is well-settled that appellate courts 
generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. See, e.g., Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 
P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). Where defendant has failed to argue 
an exception to the preservation rule, this Court should not 
consider her claim. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 
(Utah 1995). 
Even assuming arguendo that defendant had preserved such an 
argument, evidence that a search warrant was executed at 
defendant's home does not implicate evidence within the scope of 
Shickles outlines factors to be used in the balancing of 
probativeness against prejudice. In essence, Shickles 
articulates a rule 403 analysis within the context of rule 
404(b). The State has been unable to locate any cases in which 
the Shickles factors have been applied outside the context of a 
rule 404(b) analysis. That is, when cases present rule 403 
issues, but do not involve rule 404(b), courts do not engage in a 
Shickles analysis. See, e.g., State v. Castillo, 2007 UT App 324, 
170 P.3d 1147; Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84, 158 P.3d 552; 
State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d. 981 (Utah 1989). This Court should 
continue this practice. 
16 
rule 404(b). The evidence found at the home and the outstanding 
misdemeanor warrants were introduced as an integral part of the 
essential story of this crime, providing background necessary for 
the jury to have a complete picture of the crime. See Pierce, 
722 P.2d at 782 (holding that evidence showing "the general 
circumstances surrounding" the crime should not be excluded as 
"prior crimes" evidence); United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 
272 (10th Cir. 1995) (evidence is admissible when it provides 
context for the crime, "is necessary to a full presentation of 
the case, or is appropriate in order to complete the story of the 
crime. . .by proving its immediate context or the res gestae" 
(quoting U.S. v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 
1980))(internal quotation marks omitted). 
In this case, absent the evidence of the outstanding 
misdemeanor warrants, the jury would have been left to wonder why 
defendant was taken to jail and on what basis the officer 
searched her. Absent evidence of the drugs found in the home, 
the jury also would have been left without evidence critical to 
establishing defendant's intent and knowledge to possess the 
drugs. In essence, the evidence defendant sought to exclude was 
relevant background for the crime with which she was charged. As 
such, the trial court properly determined that it was governed 
not by rule 404(b), but by rules 401 and 403. See, e.g., Boyd, 
2001 UT 30 at 11 23-24 (and cases cited therein). 
17 
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the evidence about the 
search warrant execution did fall within the ambit of rule 
404(b), the evidence would nonetheless be admissible because it 
served a clear non-character purpose. Evidence of the drugs 
found in the home related directly to defendant's knowledge and 
intent to possess the drugs that were found in her pocket at the 
jail directly after police executed the warrant. And evidence 
that she had outstanding justice court warrants explained why she 
was taken to the jail where the search revealing the drugs in her 
pocket occurred. See State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 
(Utah App. 1991) (holding that although rule 404 contains no 
express exception for "background information" showing how the 
charges came forward, "the prosecutor is entitled to paint a 
factual picture of the context in which the events in question 
transpired"). 
Defendant's rule 404(b) argument thus fails on multiple 
grounds. At the outset, defendant failed to preserve it below. 
Moreover, even if the Court considers the argument, it should be 
rejected because the evidence does not fall within the ambit of 
rule 404(b). And finally, even if this Court determines that 
rule 404(b) applies, the evidence was introduced for clear, non-
character purposes. For these reasons, defendant's rule 404(b) 
claim fails. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of possession of a controlled substance 
in a correctional facility, a second degree felony. 
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1 relevant to the case. Once again, Ms. Fulkerson would like to 
2 address the Court on that. She's done some research on the law 
3 and also the facts of this case, and she wanted to just address 
4 the Court on that issue. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. What are your 
6 concerns, Ms. Fulkerson? 
7 MS. FULKERSON: Thank you again, your Honor. This is 
8 just a basic 401 (inaudible) 3 argument, your Honor. I think 
9 that this is clearly irrelevant to her arrest. I think that it 
10 would also unduly prejudice and confuse the jury in this case. 
11 Where we have a drug case, a possession of controlled 
12 substance and we have the search warrant relating to what it 
13 related to, but where she was not actually arrested in connection 
14 with that warrant I think clearly would be prejudicial in this 
15 case and I would ask that it be excluded on those grounds. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Was Ms. Downs'listed on the 
17 search warrant as a party that would be present. St the place 
18 being searched. Do --
19 MR. BLAYLOCK: She was not specifically listed; however, 
20 the search warrant says, "and search all persons present." 
21 THE COURT: Persons there. All right. Thank you. 
22 Response, Mr. Blaylock? 
2 3 MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, there are a number of facts 
2 4 that were determined at the scene that relate to her knowledge, 
2 5 lack of mistake and things of that nature. One of those 
-15-
1 particular is that the controlled substances that were found were 
2 found packaged in a manner similar to the one in her pocket, the 
3 same color as the one found in her pocket. 
4 So I would suggest that it's important that we be 
5 allowed to show, because intent is a critical issue here that 
6 there was no mistake and there was knowledge on her part. In 
7 fact, also that she lived at this location, that she was 
8 familiar with the other defendant who was charged with the 
9 other controlled substances that were found at the scene. 
10 There's a bill that comes to that address showing that 
11 in fact she does live there. As a matter of fact, she told one, 
12 of the officers she had no idea what was going on. Well, I think 
13 it would be important to show what was observed at the scene so 
14 the jury can make a decision of whether or not she should1 have 
15 known or could -- did know what was going on as opposed to merely 
16 claiming, VXI knew nothing." 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. Further response?, 
18 MR. TAN: And your Honor, if I may respond. 
19 THE COURT: You may. 
20 MR. TAN: Having done the prelim, I can address the 
21 issue. First of all, as the Information states, she is charged 
22 with just one count, and the count is very specific. The State 
23 has amended it in regards to the location. It's not the 
24 residence, but it is the jail. 
25 The original Information yes, she was charged with being 
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, which 
State 
out to the 
has 
Court, 
and subsequently to the jury, that she was found trying to 
smuggle drugs into the jail. It has nothing to do with what took 
place at the 7th East 29th South location. 
Furthermore, it is just one count. There iST nothing 
else. She is not charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. 
She is not charged with any of the controlled substances that 
were found at the location. If in fact the search warrant is 
relevant to her as well, if in fact there are relevant issues of 
her being at the location, why did the detectives and the SWAT 
team and whoever else that entered the home and did the raid, 
they cited a lot of other people. 
There were obviously one co-defendant we know of; I 
believe there might be more. However, Ms. Downs Was not cited 
or even mentioned to have any type of connection with any of 
the controlled substances within the residential area. She is 
charged with possession of a controlled substance at the jail. 
I believe that if the State was to allow or to be 
allowed to admit into evidence a search warrant and also any 
background information, then, that the State's witnesses will 
testify to, I think that's going to just confuse the jury. 
They're going to try to then link Ms. Downs, who was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance at the jail, with the fact 
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1 that there were other people charged at the residential area 
2 instead. 
3 So I think, once again, it is highly prejudicial. I 
4 don't see any probative value involved. I think it also will 
5 confuse the jury because they're going to think that she is 
6 charged with possession, and it is irrelevant if it's at the jail 
7 or at the residential area. If that's the case, once again we 
8 would ask the Court not to allow the State to amend it to a 
9 second degree of possession at a correctional facility, because 
10 the jury is going to think, "Well, she's in possession. Maybe 
11 she had the drugs back at the residential place instead of the 
12 jail," then the Information is not correct. So we would make an 
13 argument on that, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. If you wish to 
15 respond. 
16 MR. BLAYLOCK: Just one other comment. % understanding 
17 from the individuals that the defense has called as ^ witnesses is 
18 she has a very specific defense, and that is, "Those weren't my 
19 pants." So I think it's critical that the State be allowed to 
20 tie in the drugs that were found in the pants with the drugs that 
21 were found at the residence and with what was there to see at the 
22 residence and to know. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Any further response 
24 to that? 
25 MR. TAN: Nothing else, your Honor. 
-18-
1 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. The — again, the 
2 issues are very appropriately addressed at this point, but I 
3 do find that the evidence of how the defendant possessed the 
4 methamphetamine, that the burden on the State is to prove beyond 
5 a reasonable doubt her knowledge and intent into possessing the 
6 methamphetamine, and that is the first part of the charge. It is 
7 an element that the State must prove, and that this evidence goes 
8 directly to Ms. Downs' knowledge and intent; therefore, it is 
9 absolutely relevant. 
10 Whether or not it is so prejudicial that that 
11 outweighs the relevance and would be unfair and unjust to allow 
12 that evidence in, I do not find that that is the case. I think 
13 that this gives context to the jury. It is not confusing to 
14 them, that it actually gives them context, but that in order to 
15 prove any possession of a controlled substance the State has got 
16 to prove that Ms. Downs possessed the methamphetamine. 
17 Whether or not that is shown at the jail or at another 
18 place is not more prejudicial to Ms. Downs. It is not more 
19 prejudicial to Ms. Downs that she possessed it somewhere else. 
20 1 The same evidence of her possession is going to be coming in, 
21 and so the fact that it comes in in the context that it was at 
22 a search warrant at a residence where she was, and apparently 
23 there's some evidence that she resides there, goes directly to 
24 her knowledge and lack of mistake. So that goes specifically to 
25 the case — the State's ability to enter this in its case in 
-19-
1 I chief. 
2 Clearly if it is also the defense, and Ms. Downs has 
3 no responsibility to even provide any defense, but clearly if 
4 it does go to the defense, then -- then that information is 
5 appropriate there. But the first part of the ruling has got to 
6 be whether or not the State can even use it in their case in 
7 chief. I find that this is absolutely relevant to the State's 
8 element that they must prove this knowing possession, and that 
9 it -- the fact that the possession may have occurred somewhere 
10 besides the address and the correctional facility does not make 
11 it irrelevant to the case. 
12 The know -- anything that makes the possession more 
13 knowing, more intentional, more likely than not is by definition 
14 relevant, and the prejudice just simply is not extensive at all. 
15 The only prejudice that goes to Ms. Downs is that she possessed 
16 an unlawfully ~- an unlawful controlled substance. 
17 That is something that is going to have to be shown by 
18 the State or they're going to fail in the first element that they 
19 must prove. The fact that it was somewhere besides the second 
20 element that they must prove is not prejudicial to Ms. Downs. 
21 That's information that the jury and the fact finders are going 
22 to have to receive anyway. 
23 I am, however, going to make it be specific so that if 
24 there -- the cross examination may also allow that this was — 
2 5 whether or not the search warrant was specifically to Ms. Downs. 
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1 I That type of cross examination is appropriate as well. It 
2 doesn't look like there's any objection to this being why she was 
3 taken to the jail. They're not getting in the subject matter of 
4 the bench warrants for the justice courts. That doesn't seem to 
5 be necessary, and I don't get -- sense from either argument that 
6 there is any anticipation of the underlying warrants -- the 
7 nature of the underlying warrants being admitted for any 404(b) 
8 purposes. It's simply that Ms. Downs was arrested and taken to 
9 the jail. Is that what evidence the State is anticipating as far 
10 as any prior war — bench warrants or convictions? 
11 MR. BLAYLOCK: Yes, your Honor. We weren't going to 
12 delve into the nature of the warrants. We were merely going to 
13 indicate that because that's the way that they normally do these 
14 kinds of search warrants, execute these search warrants. They 
15 put people in restraints. They then check on warrants and they 
16 found warrants outstanding for Ms. Downs, and she was taken into 
17 custody, arrested for that. 
18 THE COURT: And --
19 MR. TAN: And your Honor, I believe just so that there 
20 are no unexpected surprises when actually we have the jury before 
21 us, I think that I may very well on cross examination dive into 
22 that issue, because I think if in fact the Court will allow the 
23 search warrant and some of the facts that transpired at the 
2 4 residence to come in to testimony, I think it will be important 
25 for the jury to know that even though she was picked up on 
